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exotic cylinder seals into plain beads or adornments in Mycenaean style represents a different
kind of claim about foreign exchange. Perhaps
the Theban elite were intimidated by the Near
Eastern states and the powerful heritage represented through the lapis lazuli cylinder seals.
Whatever their motivation, their strategy to limit
the spread of foreign iconography was flouted by
those actors who acquired faience cylinder seals.
The deployment of their own foreign objects
by non-palatial actors could represent the competitive acts of elite figures claiming their own
relationships with external sources of power.
The individuals who held the visual symbols of
foreign connections displayed their own opportunities and obligations beyond the local realm,

perhaps in open defiance of the centralized
authority at Thebes. International reciprocity
operating at a non-palatial level can thus be seen
as a destabilizing impulse to a centralized power
that aims to control long-distance exchange and
its resources.
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Abstract
A modified version of Marshall Sahlins’s model of reciprocity, which maps the modes of reciprocity across
kinship distance, helps elucidate reciprocity in Homer. With important qualifications, Homeric reciprocity
can also elucidate the social realities of Archaic Greece. There are three primary modes of Homeric reciprocity: general, or altruistic giving, balanced exchange, and negative taking. The model for general reciprocity
is family relationships, and it characterizes a ruler’s relationship with the community, where it masks the
reality that the upward flow of chiefly tribute exceeds the downward flow of the ruler’s largesse. Balanced
reciprocity is practiced between peers within the same community: exchange items are notionally of equivalent value and the transaction is completed within a limited timeframe. Exchanges outside the community
tend to be negative: ‘stranger’ is often synonymous with ‘enemy’.
Walter Donlan further distinguishes between balanced reciprocities that are compensatory, and tend to
be (but are not always) negative, and positive compactual reciprocities such as guest-friendship (xenia).
Significantly, compensatory reciprocity includes reciprocities that begin as negative, in which the victim
is able to exact compensation (poinē) or revenge (tisis). In Homer, balanced reciprocity consists of seven
primary ritual practices: marriage (gamos) and supplication ( hiketeia) can be related to xenia, as can
sacrifice (iera rezein), somewhat more distantly; ransom (apoina) is related to poinē and tisis. In addition to systematizing further and refining Sahlins’s model, this paper shows that the plots of both Homeric
epics are comprehensively structured by reciprocity: whereas the Iliad consists of a causal chain of balanced
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016
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exchanges, generalized, though not redistributive, reciprocities predominate in the Odyssey. The causal link
between exchanges is attenuated as a consequence.
Keywords: guest-friendship, Homer, marriage, reciprocity, revenge, sacrifice
Sahlins’s Model 50 Years Later
Among Homeric scholars, the model of reciprocity developed by Marshall Sahlins has proven
influential.1 Sahlins (1972: 191, 196-204; cf.
Schieffelin 1980: 511-12) argued that the basic
types of reciprocity—generalized, balanced, and
negative—change with the social distance separating the exchange parties. Within the immediate kinship group and community, generalized
reciprocity predominates: such reciprocities are
called generalized because they belong to a larger
system rather than a single exchange (Sahlins
1972: 196; van Wees 1998: 21-24). In its ideal
form, generalized reciprocity is selfless: one gives
because one can, one takes because one needs,
and although obligations are still felt one does
so without thought of return (Sahlins 1972:
193-94; Zanker 1998; Postlethwaite 1998; Gill
1998). The parent–child relationship embodies
generalized reciprocity, and there is a tendency to
treat other hierarchical relationships as analogous
or even identical. It covers a range of behaviors
that fall under the heading of ‘sharing’ (Sahlins
1972: 194, 196; Binford 2001: 24). Its broader,
social function is to provide material support
that creates and sustains relationships, fostering
unity within the group while subordinating it
to a leader (Sahlins 1972: 186, 190, following
Gouldner 1960: 176-77). The social aspect of
the exchange is thus more important than the
material (Sahlins 1972: 194; Donlan 1982: 140).
In Homer, prominent examples of generalized reciprocity involve kinship and its social
analogues, and the complementary relationship
between chiefly dues and generosity—the latter including public feasts and sacrifices, and
gifts and prizes.2 In general, the upward flow of
goods and services to the leader will exceed the
downward flow of largesse: for example, in war© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016

fare a basically equal division of spoils reinforces
group solidarity, while supernumerary prizes of
honor to the leader affirm rank and provide the
resources that allow him to be generous, thereby
indebting the group and securing its loyalty
and service. From Iliad 12.307-21 we see that
other forms of chiefly due in Homer include
land allotments and banqueting privileges. The
same passage suggests that such imbalances are
paid for, as it were, through effective leadership
in endeavors such as protecting the community
and enriching it with plunder.
Generally speaking, then, a primary objective
of amassing wealth is to convert it into social
rank and relationships (Sahlins 1972: 210-15).
The deferral of the return exchange and primacy
of the relationship over the material assimilates
the generalized reciprocity of ruler and his people
to the family model of such exchanges. In economic terms, however, the system reverses the
family model: the rhetoric of generosity and due,
and the deferral of return mask the expectation
of a return that will materially exceed the ruler’s
generosity, yielding an unbalanced or exploitative reciprocity, as it were. The leader who is not
sufficiently generous will, however, meet with
resentment from his followers; and both epics
suggest that such resentments were commonplace (e.g., Iliad 1.122, 231; Odyssey 10.38-42—
Donlan 1982: 163, 167-70; 1998: 64; Seaford
2004: 39-47). Reciprocity would thus seem to
map onto social hierarchy in a manner parallel to
social distance, so that wealth distinctions constrain assistance in inverse proportion to kinship
distance (Sahlins 1972: 213; Donlan 1982: 14041). Whereas ostensibly altruistic acts of generosity may nevertheless obligate and subordinate,
there is more potential for the next category of
reciprocity—balanced—to be overtly agonistic
(Mauss 1990 [1925]: 6-7, 74-75).
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Outside the immediate community, but still
among peers in the community or tribe with
whom an affinity is felt, balanced reciprocity
is the norm: ideally, the items exchanged are
of equivalent value, and the exchange is either
simultaneous or takes place within an agreedupon timeframe. In contrast with generalized
reciprocity, balanced reciprocity is less personal
and more nearly resembles economic exchange,
so that ‘the material side of the transaction is at
least as critical as the social’ (Sahlins 1972: 195;
cf. Donlan 1982: 140). The exchange parties
have distinct though possibly aligned interests.
If the debt is immediately and fully cancelled,
its role in creating and maintaining social
relationships is attenuated in comparison with
generalized reciprocity, yet it remains embedded
in such relationships, which could be compromised by an unequal exchange.
There are, however, advantages to be had by
unequal exchanges: for example, an exchange
without remainder could actually weaken the
relationship, as obligations are no longer felt
by either party (Sahlins 1972: 222-23; Donlan
1982: 146; van Wees 1998: 25-26). Unequal
exchanges can also be used to calibrate the relative social status of the exchange partners—for
example, in forming a marriage alliance (Sahlins 1972: 222-30; Donlan 1982: 145-47). As
such, they establish and advertise hierarchy; and
although such exchanges will be represented as
magnanimous, they are inherently competitive
and can even involve ‘gift attacks’ that aim not
only to mark the recipient as subordinate, but
even to deprive him of honor (timē) (Donlan
1993: 164; cf. Mauss 1990 [1925]: 29; Wilson
2002: 5; Lyons 2012: 13; on timē see Nagy 1999;
van Wees 1992; Beidelman 1989). For the same
reason, there are potential advantages in delaying
repayment, during which time the beneficiary
remains under obligation to the benefactor; nor
does the benefit accrue solely to the benefactor,
as the social bonds uniting both parties are maintained and potentially strengthened (Gouldner
1960: 174-75; Morris 1986a: 2). There are thus
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016

two primary ways of using balanced reciprocity
to sustain relationships: outbidding the initial
giver’s generosity with the return gift, and allowing time to elapse between gifts, as for example in
Homeric guest-friendship. Despite the increased
social distance between exchange partners, balanced reciprocity can thus serve the same instrumental functions as generalized.
Donlan (1982: 143-46) distinguishes between
two classes of balanced reciprocity: compensatory and compactual. Compensatory reciprocity
tends to be negative, involving, for example,
debts, fines, and compensation for loss of life,
possessions, or honor; but it can also include
wages and rewards. Such reciprocities follow the
logic of gift-exchange in that an initial action
creates a subordinating ‘debt’ that the recipient seeks to ‘repay’ in an equalizing exchange.
For example, someone may receive an insult,
thereby losing timē, and then repay the insult by
inflicting an equivalent loss. Under the rubric of
compactual reciprocity, Donlan (1982: 145, 148)
places ‘peace-making and friendship agreements,
marital alliances, hospitality, gift-giving, and giftexchange’. Such reciprocities may thus concretely
signify the choice to pursue self-interest through
alliance rather than negative reciprocity. Whereas
compensatory reciprocity emphasizes the material aspect of the exchange, compactual reciprocity emphasizes the social (Donlan 1982: 151).
Reciprocities with strangers are assumed to be
negative, eristic and unsociable: non-kin is often
a ‘synonym for “enemy” or “stranger”’ (Sahlins
1972: 197), while a stranger can be a synonym
for ‘thief ’ (Walcot 2009 [1977]: 141). At its
limit, negative reciprocity involves ‘the attempt
to get something for nothing with impunity’
(Sahlins 1972: 195). The social and economic
interests of the exchange parties are thus directly
opposed. Tactics involve ‘various degrees of cunning, guile, stealth, and violence’ (Sahlins 1972:
195). Prominent examples in Homer include:
commercial trade, theft, piracy, cattle raids, the
capture of persons for slavery, killing, war, and
insults or other attacks on personal honor.

Discussion and Debate
In Homer, most moveable goods are acquired
through gift exchange or warfare and related
activities (Donlan 1982: 142, 151; Seaford 1994:
18-19). Conversely, slaves are ‘virtually the only
objects bought by Greeks’ (Finley 1954a: 173),
while commodity exchange never occurs within
the same community (Seaford 1994: 17-18;
2004: 25-27). Finally, as the above example on
insults illustrates, there is always the possibility
that a negative reciprocity will be transformed
into Donlan’s compensatory reciprocity.
This leads to an important distinction that
van Wees (1998) draws between Sahlins’s negative reciprocities, noting that they include
exchanges where ‘it is the attitude of the participants which is negative, insofar as they are
openly “selfish” and “mean” with positively valued objects of exchange’, and those where
it is the objects of exchange, the insults and
injuries traded, which are negatively valued.
The exchange of harm between enemies may
quite properly be called ‘negative reciprocity’,
but has no place at the end of a spectrum
ranging from altruistic to egotistic attitudes
toward exchange. (van Wees 1998: 24)

Stated differently, in Sahlins’s model, negative
reciprocity ranges from commercial profit to
simple theft and other imposed losses, as well as
to revenge over such losses; and van Wees objects
to the linkage between pure taking and revenge
on the grounds that the psychology of the
agents is incompatible.
At first this might seem to confirm the wisdom of mapping reciprocity onto social distance, and it should be noted that taking and
revenge are analogous as impositions of loss.
Nevertheless, the sentiment of the exchange
partners is central to Sahlins’s model, which
can be reconfigured in affective terms, such that
generalized reciprocity is pure giving motivated
by positive sentiment and a resulting disposition to altruism, while balanced reciprocity is
equal exchange motivated by positive sentiment
and self-interest and a resulting disposition to
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016
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fairness, and negative reciprocity is pure taking,
motivated either by pure egoism, in exchanges
resulting in loss, or by anger over suffering loss.
In the latter case, this may lead to the attempted
exercise of revenge or material compensation.
The egoistic taking of the first type of negative
reciprocity thus stands in contrast with the selfless giving of generalized reciprocity; the second
type is identical with the first as a form of pure
taking, and as such likewise stands in contrast
with the pure giving of generalized reciprocity.
But its affective motivation, the anger felt by the
agent towards the exchange partner, is antithetical to the positive feelings that characterize generalized reciprocity; and if successfully executed
it combines with the first negative reciprocity to
produce a type of Donlan’s compensatory reciprocity. These congruencies and oppositions are
possible because generalized reciprocity includes
both a sentiment, symbolized by parental love,
and a resulting action, selfless giving, which can
be separately opposed: selfless giving by egoistic
taking, a parent’s love by a victim’s hatred. Sentiment thus helps determine, and can significantly nuance, understanding of the exchange
behavior. Nevertheless, van Wees is right to
treat these exchanges as distinct: altruistic giving
and taking with impunity are opposed as positive and negative reciprocities; revenge, on the
other hand, is a negative balanced reciprocity,
opposed to positive balanced reciprocities such
as gift exchange. Finally, it should be noted that
both types of negative reciprocity, selfish taking and revenge for selfish taking, can be used
to create, sustain, and structure relations at the
personal and (inter)communal level.
These categories of reciprocity should be
viewed as a heuristic device: they lack native
vocabulary and in actual practice there is considerable slippage and overlap between them
(Donlan 1982; Appadurai 1986; Ferguson 1988:
495). It is better to conceptualize them as a
continuum ranging from altruistic generosity
to unavenged murder (Sahlins 1972: 191-93):
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Reciprocities and social distance (adapted from Sahlins 1972: 199, fig. 5.1).

to use a mathematical analogy, pure giving and
taking constitute its infinite positive and negative
limits, implied by, but strictly standing outside,
the sequence of possible reciprocities (Figure 1).
In terms of this continuum, market trade can
be located on the notional boundary between
positive and negative balanced reciprocity, with
profit constituting the negative aspect of the
exchange (Sahlins 1972: 195; Donlan 1982:
141). It is doubtless true that Homeric characters’ disdain for traders reflects an aristocratic
disapproval of ‘activities that are not embedded
in a social relationship, and confer no prestige,
but are regarded as negative and unsociable’
(Donlan 1982: 141 n. 7; see also Sahlins 1972:
232-33; Morris 1986a: 5-6; Beidelman 1989:
228; Appadurai 1986: 33; Seaford 2004: 32-33,
37-38). A more direct explanation is that a
function of embedding such exchanges in social
relationships is to disguise their economic function (Bourdieu 1977: 171-77; Appadurai 1986:
11-12; Kurke 1991: 96). On the other hand,
‘Mentes’ describes the necessary trade in which
he is engaged, exchanging iron for bronze, as a
perfectly honorable activity (Odyssey 1.180-84).
He is thus engaged in the balanced reciprocity
characteristic of intercommunal trade friendships and partnerships (Sahlins 1972: 200-202).
To sum up before proceeding: in Homer,
generalized reciprocity creates, articulates, and
sustains the community under a leader; it integrates socially and differentiates hierarchically.
The analogy to family relationships is acknowledged when characterizing Odysseus, qua ruler,
with ‘he was gentle as a father’ (Odyssey 2.47,
234, 5.12; see also Sahlins 1972: 205-209;
Donlan 1982: 141, 169; 1998: 56). Whereas
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016

generalized reciprocity is analogous to the parent–child relationship, which it may reproduce
socially, balanced reciprocity is compared to
sibling relationships, thus underlining both the
familial analogy and notional equality of the
agents (see below). All types of reciprocity interpellate both exchange partners in terms of character and status: when Menelaus attempts to
give Telemachus a chariot and team of horses as
a guest-gift (xenion), he is, among other things,
imposing an identity on both Telemachus and
himself (Beidelman 1989: 227-29; van Wees
1998: 29-30; Seaford 2004: 26).
Types of Homeric Reciprocity
The constitution of Homeric society is crucial
to understanding Homeric reciprocity, and vice
versa. The epics may be a mash-up of material extending from the proto-Indo-European
period to the sixth century bc, and from Tartessos to Nineveh, but the social world of the
epics is that of Homer’s audience (Snodgrass
1974: 121-22; Donlan 1982; 1993: 155-59,
172; 1998: 52-54; Raaflaub 1991: 207-15;
Seaford 1994: 6; Wilson 2002: 11-12; Antonaccio, this issue). Indeed, their contemporary
relevance was key to their popularity, as of traditional poetry generally (Seaford 1994: 5). This
requires, however, two important qualifications:
first, Homeric society is radically streamlined by
the process of Panhellenization to produce an
account onto which audiences throughout the
Greek world could project their own social realities, values, and anxieties (Nagy 1999). Second,
but equally important, it does not simply mirror
a generalized image of contemporary Greece but
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is itself actively shaping the world it describes
(Wilson 2002: 6, 11-12, 37-8; Cook 2004:
48-51). It is thus a refraction of an abstraction;
and any attempt to play a game of connect the
dots, which one is entitled to do with material
artifacts such as shield-types, will produce at
best an incomplete account.
The poems generally distinguish between elites
and non-elites, with little attempt to articulate
further hierarchy. Status within elite society is
notionally egalitarian. In place of established
institutional structures, competition serves to
articulate elite society in a zero-sum ranking
system. Homer describes three principal forums
of elite competition: political, based on the number of men a leader can mobilize; intellectual,
including ability as a speaker and counselor; and
athletic, including warfare and games.
Reciprocity plays a central role in elite competition for status, while being allowed to reciprocate
with other elites establishes elite identity as such.
Elite heads of household sought to attract other
households into a network of mutual support;
peers so aligned within the community are called
‘friends’ (philoi) and ‘companions’ (hetairoi) (e.g.,
Iliad 17.150; see Konstan 1998 on reciprocity
and friendship). Although such networks practice
generalized reciprocity, pacts of friendship could
be sealed with compactual reciprocity consisting
of gift exchange (Donlan 1982: 145). Such gifts
had intrinsic value (Finley 1954a: 180; Snodgrass
1974: 124), but this is rarely made explicit: a
mixing bowl may be solid silver, gilded, and the
work of Hephaistos (Odyssey 4.613-20—on the
biographies of objects, see Kopytoff 1986; Greth
lein 2008; Whitley 2013), but as an object of gift
exchange it is virtually never valued in head of
cattle. It is also important to stress the immaterial aspect of Homeric reciprocity; even material
goods attain their value from an economy that is
largely symbolic (Mauss 1990 [1925]: 5).
Homer describes seven other types of balanced
reciprocity that play an instrumental role in the
elite pursuit of honor (timē): marriage (gamos),
guest-friendship (xenia), supplication (hiketeia),
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016
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sacrifice (e.g., iera rezein), revenge (tisis), compensation (poinē), and ransom (apoina). The first
four of these reciprocities are compactual, the
last three compensatory. Given Greek assumptions that strangers are not simply not philoi but
hostile, managing relations with them is highly
fraught and regulated by ritual and religious
sanctions. All four compactual reciprocities thus
serve to convert hostile outsiders into friendly
insiders. There is a noteworthy tendency for
the relationships they establish to overlap and
to approximate generalized reciprocity, with the
further result that the exchange parties are assimilated to the status of kin. This is literally the case
with marriage alliances, but marriage should not
be seen as the model for the others: rather it is the
direction in which all naturally tend.
Gamos and xenia are isomorphic, in that both
serve to incorporate someone unrelated by blood
into the household in a dependent relationship,
and both create obligations of mutual support between male heads of household (Seaford
1994: 16-17; cf. van Gennep 1960: 141; Donlan 1982: 150).3 Whereas gamos is an actual
kinship alliance, xenia creates ‘an association
that resembles kinship’ (Donlan 1982: 150; cf.
Gould 1973: 93) and as such can be inherited
(Iliad 6.215, 231; Odyssey 1.187, 417, 17.522).
Donlan identifies the association of xenia with
kinship as the reason ‘father Zeus’ is the patron
of strangers; which explanation can be extended
to include his patronage of suppliants and beggars. Whereas xenia relationships are sealed with
gift exchange, gamos may include gifts from the
bride’s parents and her suitors (Finley 1954a;
Lacey 1966; Snodgrass 1974; Donlan 1982:
145-47; 1989: 4; Morris 1986b: 105-10; Seaford 1994: 16; Burkert 1996: 132-33; Patterson
1998: 56-62; Foley 2001: 63-64).
Marriage is typically virilocal, both to manage succession and to ensure that the husband
remains a readily available resource in his father’s
household. Exceptionally powerful households,
however, may retain both sons and daughters in
marriage, so that the household’s manpower is
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further augmented. Moreover, gamos is typically
used, while xenia is only used to form interstate
alliances (Finley 1954a: 172). As a result, both
institutions can create loyalties that pit elite selfinterest against that of community. In Homer,
however, proper marriage does not have this
effect, whereas xenia both can and notoriously
does in the case of Diomedes and Glaucus (Iliad
6.119-236): when Diomedes acknowledges that
he and Glaucus are ancestral guest-friends, he
declines to fight Glaucus and even wishes him
luck killing whichever Greeks he can run down.
He does not, however, stop competing with Glaucus, boasting that his grandfather Oeneus hosted
Glaucus’s grandfather Bellerophon more lavishly
than the king of Lycia had, and that Bellerophon
had voluntarily subordinated himself to Oeneus
by offering the more costly exchange gift, as
Glaucus himself will presently do (Donlan 1989:
11-12). This episode has been adequately studied
by others, but I do need to make one observation
in light of my earlier claims about the symbolic
economy of gift exchange and aristocratic contempt of market trade. Homer’s remark that the
gods stole Glaucus’s wits, since he exchanged
armor worth a hundred cattle for armor worth
nine, would seem to weigh against both claims,
but this is the only case where Homer notes the
actual cost of the exchange items. I suggest that
doing so calls attention to something else going
on in the scene: gift-exchange between friends
here literally stands in the place of a duel between
enemies that Glaucus was certain to lose. Assigning the armor drastically unequal value signals
that Diomedes ‘won’ an exchange that does not
normally serve this overt purpose among philoi
(Calder 1984; Donlan 1989; Tandy 1997: 99 n.
78). This explanation obtains however one interprets the motives of the exchange partners.
Hiketeia is isomorphic with xenia and gamos
in cases where the suppliant obtains a dependent
relationship that involves incorporation into
the household (oikos); like gamos, the relationship can be between members of the same or
different communities. Gould calls attention
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016

to the ‘systematic parallelism’ between the roles
of guest-friend and suppliant ‘and their function within the structure of social relationships’,
noting that hiketeia may include gift-giving by
either or both parties, and making the suppliant
an actual xenos (Gould 1973: 79, 90-94; Pedrick
1982; Goldhill 1991: 72-75; Seaford 1994: 8,
50, 70-71; Burkert 1996: 86-88; Naiden 2006).
Odysseus’s supplication of Arete, for example,
results in Alcinous’s providing xenia and even
offering gamos. Consciousness of the affinity
between hiketeia and xenia is suggested by the
statement that ‘Zeus is the avenger of suppliants
and strangers, Zeus-Xenios, who accompanies
revered strangers’ (Odyssey 9.270-71), while the
claim that ‘a guest and suppliant is the same as
a sibling’ (Odyssey 8.546) assimilates both to the
status of factitious brotherhood (Gould 1973:
93; Seaford 1994: 71). Social kinship, of course,
defines gamos relations, though any time a nonslave is incorporated into the household it would
be natural to use the language of kinship to characterize the relationship. Predictably, then, just as
friends outside the community are ‘the same as a
brother’, a friend within the community (hetairos) may be ‘not at all inferior to a brother’ (Odyssey 8.585-86) or simultaneously ‘comrade and
brother’ (Odyssey 21.216), or imagined as fellow
members of a ‘tribe’ (Iliad 3.32) when providing
shelter from the enemy.
Hiketeia may occur whenever someone wants
something, whether on his own or another’s
behalf, but is unable to secure it and recognizes
that someone else could. Thus, whereas alliances
are formed by xenia and gamos in the expectation
of mutual support, the support sought through
hiketeia proceeds, at least initially, in one direction only. The suppliant, however, will call attention to any past services in an effort to cast the
reciprocity as balanced, while in cases involving
defeated or captured persons, he promises ransom, or apoina. Generally speaking, if the supplication is accepted then some sort of return is
expected. In further contrast to xenia and gamos,
the suppliant initiates the supplication with a per-
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formance of status inequality through voluntary
self-abasement, followed by the actual request.
If the supplication is successful, the supplicand
restores the suppliant to dignity and grants the
request. An offer of xenia is an extension of the
same process, transforming the suppliant into a
peer engaging in balanced exchange.
Sacrifice is analogous to gamos, xenia, and
hiketeia as a balanced reciprocity, based on the
principle of do ut des, that formalizes a dependency relationship among the exchange parties
(Mauss 1990 [1925]: 17; cf. Burkert 1996: 13438; Parker 1998; Bremer 1998; Seaford 2004:
39-47; Antonaccio, this issue; Morris, this issue).
In terms of the asymmetry between god and
human it most closely resembles hiketeia. On the
other hand, from the standpoint of the sacrificer
and his community, the asymmetry is reversed: in
offering sacrifice, the sacrificer unites and articulates a community that is now in his debt, both
for securing good relations with the gods and for
providing a sacrificial feast (Seaford 2004: 40-41).
As we have seen, feasting is in fact the most common form of notionally generalized reciprocity in
Homer, although, as we have also seen, this masks
an underlying economy of exchange in the ruler’s
favor: with sacrifice, an analogy is established
that relates ruler to god and thereby inverts the
asymmetry of exchange into one that verges on
generalized reciprocity by the ruler.
An analogy can also be drawn between the
status of suppliant/worshipper and that of beggar
(ptōkhos) as recipients of generalized reciprocity
in a situation of total dependency: the suppliant’s
voluntary self-abasement strengthens the affinity.
As in the case of suppliants, moreover, some sort
of return is expected from beggars, so that the
reciprocity is de facto balanced while still allowing
it to be portrayed as generalized, and the benefactor as magnanimous (Donlan 1982: 156). Xenos,
hiketēs, and ptōkhos thus constitute a descending
scale of honor, but each is under the protection of
Zeus and as such deserves similar treatment: thus
‘all strangers and beggars are under Zeus’s protection’ (Odyssey 6.207-208, 14.57-58). Unlike
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016
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xenoi, however, ptōkhoi are never compared to
kin.
Negative reciprocity affects the relative status
(timē) of both parties. If it does not meet with a
response, the agent gains status which the victim
loses to him. In battle, for example, the ideal is
to kill the enemy ‘with impunity’, and thereby
acquire enhanced timē, concretely embodied in
armor stripped from the victim. The timē won is
not equivalent to the material value of the armor,
but calibrated by the relative status of the victim
within a parallel hierarchy among the enemy.
As such, it can be more closely correlated with
material value in the division of spoils afterwards,
but other factors such as political and intellectual capital affect their distribution: the award
of Chryseis to Agamemnon reflects his status as
commander-in-chief and not his achievements
in battles in which he did not in fact participate.
Warfare thus allows elites within the community
to compete with each other indirectly through
negative reciprocity. Athletics allow analogous
competition within the community, but this is
not how they are portrayed in the Iliad, where
only representative leaders of the Greek contingents compete in the games for Patroclus: they
are thus analogous to Panhellenic festivals, which
serve to channel elite competition outside the
local community.
The victim of negative reciprocity, or someone
related, will calculate the risk of seeking redress,
that is of turning negative reciprocity into the
first element of Donlan’s compensatory reciprocity. The victim may then seek to do so by exacting revenge (tisis) or compensation (poinē). Tisis
and poinē are to various degrees interchangeable,
depending on context, and in fact etymologically
cognate: both terms represent the return of the
damages, such that the perpetrator or his household is required to lose something of equivalent
value to what he took from his victim; in cases
where the poinē consists of reprisal killing, it is
functionally equivalent to tisis (e.g., Iliad 14.48384; cf. Burkert 1996: 133-34; Wilson 2002: 14778). More commonly, poinē consists of material
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goods; in such cases, its social function is to
ensure peaceful relations between the concerned
parties (Donlan 1982: 144). If the loss consists
of the victim’s life, either compensatory strategy
may be pursued; in such situations, the role of
exacting harm for harm falls to a father, brother,
or friend (hetairos or philos) who thereby assumes
the role of kin (Wilson 2002: 30). In cases of
manslaughter where poinē is not accepted, the
killer may go into exile instead of being killed,
as this represents the equivalent loss of life to the
household. Poinē and tisis restore both families to
their relative status prior to the initial loss; they
compensate the victim for his loss, or if the loss
consists of his own death they compensate his
relatives. In cases of reprisal killing by friends, the
victim’s family may receive nothing, though the
avenging party does acquire timē, and the victim
himself is felt to be avenged (Iliad 13.414; Odyssey 23.312; cf. Slatkin 2011: 178). Like gamos,
poinē sets objects belonging to different spheres
into exchange relation. The Iliad dramatizes the
inadequacy of material goods to compensate for
a human life and the social imperative to accept
the exchange; the Odyssey’s darker vision is that
only life will compensate for lost honor.
Apoina (ransom) is cognate with poinē and
tisis and it serves a related if distinct function
(Wilson 2002: 13-39). Whereas the victim has
potential recourse to either tisis or poinē any time
he suffers negative reciprocity, apoina is essentially restricted to reciprocity between enemy
combatants in the Iliad. In cases where someone
is defeated in battle, he may offer apoina, usually on behalf of his father, so that the victor will
spare his life and release him; if taken captive,
the victim’s father may offer apoina to secure his
release. In either case, the offer begins with hiketeia (Wilson 2002: 28-29). With the exception
of Agamemnon’s offer of apoina to Achilles, only
Trojans offer apoina in the Iliad, and only to
Greeks, while both Trojans and Greeks exact and
pay poinē (Wilson 2002: 71-108). Such offers
always fail in the Iliad, though the poem creates
a backstory in which they succeed, and Priam
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016

does exchange apoina with Achilles for Hector’s
corpse. Like poinē, apoina is a payment equal
in value to the victim’s life; in contrast to poinē,
apoina both preserves the honor and wealth the
victor has won by gaining mastery over the victim, and the loss the victim’s family has suffered,
which is converted from human life to prestige
goods.
In sum: xenia, gamos, and hiketeia are structurally and functionally related ritual institutions
regulating balanced reciprocity, as are poinē
and apoina within the system of balanced negative reciprocity. Xenia and apoina are properly
used to manage relations between elites from
different communities, while gamos, hiketeia,
and poinē manage relations within the same or
different communities. Together with tisis they
are routinely employed for competitive means,
often in combination with other forms of reciprocity. Gamos, xenia, hiketeia, and sacrifice all
use reciprocity to create and manage alliances.
Poinē and tisis use reciprocity to restore relative
timē after suffering loss, while apoina uses it to
consolidate timē so acquired while sparing the
captive’s life. Under either scenario, a human
life may be exchanged for goods or another life,
although such conversions between exchange
spheres are also portrayed as highly problematic,
if culturally sanctioned.
Reciprocity as an Organizing Principle of the
Epic Plot
I conclude with how reciprocity structures the
plot of both epics. The Iliad can be understood
as a causal chain of balanced reciprocity marked
by a consistent failure of compensatory exchange
to resolve conflict (Seaford 1994: 23-25): in the
backstory, Paris acquires Helen by negative reciprocity, violating xenia; Agamemnon leads a war
against Troy, a negative reciprocity constituting
tisis that creates balanced reciprocity; during the
war, Agamemnon acquires Chryseis by negative
reciprocity; Chryses offers apoina to recover
his daughter, which would create a balanced
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reciprocity; Agamemnon, however, rejects the
exchange, inflicting further negative reciprocity
on Chryses, and by extension Apollo, in the
form of dishonor; Apollo then inflicts negative reciprocity in the form of tisis that causes
Agamemnon to lose Chryseis and the timē she
embodies; Agamemnon holds Achilles responsible and inflicts negative reciprocity on him by
appropriating Briseis and the timē she embodies;
Achilles withdraws from the fighting and Zeus
aids the Trojans, inflicting negative reciprocity
on Agamemnon in the form of tisis that produces another balanced reciprocity; this causes
Agamemnon to offer compensatory reciprocity
to restore Achilles’s honor by returning Briseis;
the offer, however, includes a ‘gift-attack’, a
negative reciprocity designed to subordinate
Achilles (Donlan 1993; Wilson 2002: 71-108);
Achilles rejects the offer and continues imposing
negative reciprocity on Agamemnon; Hector
inflicts negative reciprocity on Patroclus, and by
extension Achilles, by killing him; Achilles then
inflicts tisis on Hector by killing him in return,
thereby imposing compensatory reciprocity;
Priam offers Achilles compensatory reciprocity in the form of apoina for Hector’s corpse;
Achilles, however transforms the apoina into
another balanced reciprocity, xenia, by compelling Priam to dine and sleep under his roof. The
pattern implies a causal connection between
Achilles’s rejection of Agamemnon’s offer and
the death of Patroclus, which would otherwise
be the only break in the causal sequence.
In contrast with the system of balanced
exchanges in the Iliad, the preponderance of generalized—though not redistributive—reciprocity
in the Odyssey is striking. A result is a weakening
of the causal links between reciprocities which,
nevertheless, still comprehensively structure the
plot; as in the Iliad, the plot involves tisis
over negative reciprocity that includes improper
courtship of a ruler’s wife and theft of his property. Athena’s support of Odysseus’s oikos is generalized reciprocity: it is ostensibly for sacrifices
offered to Zeus over nine years ago that Athena
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016
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appeals to her father to send Odysseus home; she
then helps Telemachus search for his father out
of simple loyalty to the family; the suitors abuse
the rules of hospitality and courtship, and pervert the generalized reciprocity of the ruler’s feast
into negative reciprocity (Seaford 1994: 65);
in another example of generalized reciprocity,
Calypso helps Odysseus leave Ogygia; Poseidon
raises a storm that destroys Odysseus’ ship as tisis
for blinding the Cyclops, a balanced reciprocity
imposed by a family member; Ino-Leucothea
rescues him out of simple pity (5.336), another
act of generalized reciprocity; Odysseus supplicates Nausikaa, who provides him with food
and clothes, declares to her maids that she would
not be adverse to gamos with such a man, and
instructs him to seek further assistance from
her mother—her actions, which are essentially
generalized reciprocity, anticipate the xenia and
gamos that Alcinous subsequently offers; Odysseus supplicates Arete, whereupon Alcinous
offers xenia, even though he presumably has no
intention of visiting Odysseus, and follows on
with an offer of uxorilocal gamos, both acts bordering on generalized reciprocity; the other kings
of Scherie also offer hospitality-gifts, after which
Alcinous provides escort home, again essentially
generalized reciprocity masquerading as balanced. Athena appears to Odysseus on the shore
of Ithaca and offers her assistance even though
he has not prayed to her; she continues to help
him to the end of the poem, even though he
nowhere promises or offers sacrifice, thus continuing her generalized reciprocity to the oikos;
the disguised Odysseus seeks and achieves xenia
with Penelope, a balanced reciprocity based on
his former hospitality to ‘Odysseus’; when Odysseus reveals himself to the suitors, Eurymachus
offers material compensation for their depredations—that is, he attempts to transform their
negative reciprocity into a balanced reciprocity
of the poinē type. Odysseus, however, insists on
tisis, compensating his lost honor with human
life; Penelope subsequently recognizes Odysseus,
converting xenia to gamos; and Zeus imposes
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forgetfulness (lēthē) on the suitors’ parents so
that Odysseus’ reciprocity remains unanswered
by further tisis. Of the many things that the
epics have been said to be, arguably none is
truer than the claim that they are meditations on
reciprocity and its discontents, and in particular
the necessity and ultimate inadequacy of material compensation for loss (Slatkin 2011; Cook
2012: lv, lviii-lix).
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cf. Sahlins 1972: 149-83; Wagner-Hasel 2006).
On applying Sahlins to Homer, see Donlan
(1982; cf. Tandy 1997: 94; Thalmann 1998:
259-64). On Homer, cf. also Beidelman (1989;
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food is the most widely employed medium of
generalized reciprocity. On Homeric feasting,
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3. The locus classicus on gamos is Lévi-Strauss
(1969 [1949]; cf. Wohl 1998; Ormand 1999;
Lyons 2003). On xenia, see Herman (1987); for
Homeric xenia, see Finley (1954b: 99-104) and
Donlan (1989: 6-10).
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MacCormack (1976), and Gregory (1982:
15-24) provide helpful context. Seminal works
on reciprocity include: Malinowski (1922: 14694; 1926: 9-68, cf. Appadurai 1986: 18-22),
Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949]; cf. Damon 1980);
Simmel 1971 [1908], and Mauss (1990 [1925];
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Abstract
This paper focuses on reciprocity in the context of Bronze Age collapse and early Iron Age ‘reboot’. The highest level of Mycenaean hierarchy collapsed, but neither the entire system, nor the entire ideology, vanished
with the palaces: the basileus and a warrior elite survived and moved into places of authority. The circulation of prestige goods through networks of relationships continued, connecting especially the Levant and
Cyprus with Crete and Euboia in the early Iron Age. Such objects and the relationships they embody created
© The Fund for Mediterranean Archaeology/Equinox Publishing Ltd., 2016

